Finding the universal artificial intelligent agent is the old dream of AI scientists. Solomonoff Induction was one big step towards this, giving a universal solution to the general problem of sequence prediction by defining a universal prior distribution. Hutter defined the AIXI model, which extends the latter to the reinforcement learning framework, where almost all if not all AI problems can be formulated. However, new difficulties arise because the agent is now active, whereas it is only passive in the sequence prediction case. This makes proving AIXI's optimality difficult. In fact, we prove that the current definition of AIXI can sometimes be suboptimal in a certain sense, but that this behavior is still the most rational one, hence emphasizing the difficulty of universal reinforcement learning.
Introduction
In [2] , Hutter developed what could be called the optimally rational agent AIXI. By merging the very general framework of reinforcement learning [15] with the universal sequence predictor defined by Solomonoff Induction [14] , AIXI is supposed to optimally solve any problem, at least when the solution is computable. Hutter even proved that AIXI is Pareto optimal [3] , i.e. that no other agent can do better in at least one environment and do at least as well in all other environments. AIXI is parameter-free, apart from the horizon function, which is a (usually decreasing) weighting function of the future time steps.
One important problem is that, like Solomonoff Induction, the AIXI model is not computable. But since it is an upper-bound of intelligent agents, this can be used as a lighthouse for defining computable agents. With this in mind, a Monte-Carlo version of AIXI was created [16] , showing that MC-AIXI could solve several different problems with the exact same setting. However, the authors had to augment MC-AIXI with an exploration strategy to obtain better results. They state:
It is worth noting that, in principle, the AIXI agent does not need to explore according to any heuristic policy. This is since the value of information, in terms of expected future reward, is implicitly captured in the expectimax operation [...] . Theoretically, ignoring all computational concerns, it is sufficient just to choose a large horizon and pick the action with the highest expected value at each time step. Unfortunately, this result does not carry over to our approximate AIXI agent.
This paper
1 shows that this is a concern with AIXI in general, and not specifically of the scaled-down version. It is the transposition of the exploration/exploitation dilemma [15] in the universal setting of computable environments.
Intuitively, suppose that at each time step, the agent AIXI is given a choice between actions a and b. At first, doing a will give the agent a reward, whereas b returns a punishment. As time goes on, AIXI infers with increasing probability that this setting will remain as is forever, although it may still try action b from time to time. But, after some sufficiently long time, the inferred probability that b is useless is so high that AIXI considers it is unsuitable to try action b anymore. It therefore stops exploring, i.e. stops testing b, as this would lead to a punishment with high probability. In one sense (that of Pareto optimality and of rationality), it is in fact right. But if, after a very long time, b eventually starts to return an even higher reward than a, AIXI will never find it out. In such a setting, AIXI could do better at each time step, but does not: its number of suboptimal choices tends to infinity.
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, some notation is introduced, followed by the definition of the general class of universal Bayesian learning agents (like AIXI), and by the definition of the optimal, non-learning, fully knowledgeable agent for a given environment. Some examples of horizon functions are also given. The next section proves the main theorem: No universal Bayesian agent sufficiently explores to always converge to the current optimal policy. Finally, we consider the case of incomputable horizon functions, which may solve the described problem, although this remains unknown.
Preleminaries
The notation is similar to that in [5] . X and Y are finite sets defining the vocabulary of the interaction between the agent and the environment. An action/output y k ∈ Y of the agent at step k is also the input of the environment. The output x k ∈ X of the environment is also the input of the agent, and is composed of a reward part r k = r(x k ) and of some information o k = o(x k ). One interaction cycle is denoted by yx k = y k x k .
A string x 1 x 2 . . . x n is a sequence of x t ∈ X, ordered by t. We write x n:m = x n x n+1 . . . x m , and also x <k = x 1:k−1 and similarly for y and yx. The empty string is denoted by .
At each new step k, the agent outputs an action y k depending on history yx <k , then the environment outputs x k depending on yx <k y k , and then the next step k+1 begins. The string yx 1:k = y 1 x 1 y 2 x 2 . . . y k x k is the interaction string between the agent and the environment.
The size of a string is denoted |yx 1:k | = |x 1:k | = k. Note that this is different from the length (s) of a string s which is defined as the number of bits used to encode s on the device under consideration, such as a Turing machine.
Agents
In this section, we recall the definition of universal Bayesian learning agents. Such an agent chooses its actions so as to maximize the expected reward, using a Bayes mixture over all possible environments. In this paper, we only need to consider deterministic environments. The learning agent should then be able to asymptotically converge to the best, non-learning agent AIMU, defined in the next section. The agent AIXI is a particular case of the following generic agent AIρ. This is directly based on [5, p.8-10] and [4] , where the binary horizon function m k is replaced by a general function γ k,t .
Let Q be the set of all environments as partial functions (programs) q : Y * → X * , defined by means of chronological Turing machines [5, p.8] . Similarly, let P be the set of all policies p : X * → Y * . Let Q k ⊆ Q be the set of environments/programs that are consistent with the history yx <k :
Let P k ⊆ P be the set of policies/programs of the agent that are consistent with the history yx <k :
Let ρ : Q → [0, 1] be a probability distribution that assigns a prior probability to any given environment q. For convenience (but abusing notation), we let:
which is the total weight of the environments/programs that are consistent with the history yx <k , and:
and ρ k (q) := 0 if q ∈ Q k . This is the relative weight of an environment compared to all environments that are consistent with the history yx <k . For a given horizon function γ k,t (a temporal weight), the γ-discounted value of a given policy p in a given environment q at step k is:
with Γ k := ∞ t=k γ k,t and r t = r(x t ), where x t is defined by x <t x t = q(y 1:t ), and y t is defined by y <t y t = p(x <t ). Various possibilities for γ k,t are discussed in section 2.4. In the remainder, without loss of generality with respect to any bounded interval, we always consider that r t ∈ [0, 1].
The value of a given policy p on average in all environments, when computed for the agent AIρ is:
The best policy that the agent AIρ must follow (only) in step k to maximize the ρ−expected reward is:
If there are more than one best policy p, we take the first one in lexicographical order. Put simply, the agent AIρ chooses the policy that maximizes the chances to obtain good rewards.
The chosen action at the current step k is then the first action proposed by the policy p ρ k .
Universal agents
For a given prior ρ about the a priori distribution of all environments, we can define an agent AIρ. The prior ρ defines the initial or model-free knowledge of the agent about the prior probabilities of environments. It is not needed for ρ to be a probability distribution, and it can be only a semi-measure that satisfies:
Definition 1. For a given agent AIρ with a prior distribution ρ on environments, AIρ is said to be a universal agent iff:
A universal agent does not discard any environment possibility a priori, but discards environments once they become inconsistent with the interaction history. Note that in this paper we consider only agents with a static prior, i.e. ρ(q) does not change with the history (except if the program is not consistent with the history). Other dynamic priors, such as the Speed Prior S [12] , have different properties that are not investigated here. In the remaining of this paper, AIρ is supposed to be universal.
AIMU
AIMU is the hypothetical best possible agent for a given environment. It has the full knowledge of its environment, and thus can predict the environment's outputs perfectly in the case the latter is deterministic. As AIMU defines the optimal behavior, whatever the past history of interactions, it will be used to compare the performance of the learning agent AIρ.
The definition of the agent AIMU can be reduced to the following question: what is the best action to do at current step k, given the history yx <k of inputs and outputs, and the knowledge of the true/generating probability distribution µ of the environment? In the case of deterministic environments, the knowledge of µ means the agent knows exactly what the outputs of the true environments will be, which allows it to test all policies and find the one that truly maximizes the future cumulated discounted reward. No agent can do better than that, at least in this single environment µ.
The optimal non-learning agent AIMU is simply defined by replacing ρ by µ in equations (2)- (3), where, in the case of deterministic environments, the class of environments is restricted to the true environment/program q 0 , and µ(q 0 ) = 1 (and µ(q) = 0∀q = q 0 ). AIMU is in general not a universal agent as its knowledge allows it to give a null probability to most environments.
Horizon functions
To completely define a Bayesian agent, a horizon function must be chosen. In this section we give some simple examples of horizon functions γ k,t , which weight the future time steps and define "how far" the agent can foresee. See [4, 5] for additional discussion.
The horizon function must fulfill some properties:
To avoid convergence problems in (1), a horizon function must fulfill the requirements of equation (6).
Fixed Lifetime.
If the agent has a fixed initial lifetime T ,
2.4.2. Constant Horizon.
With a constant horizon, the agent can see m steps ahead:
Variable Horizon.
With a variable horizon m k , the agent can see a number of steps ahead, depending on its own age k:
Hyperbolic/Harmonic Discounting.
It seems that humans and animals have a hyperbolic discounting horizon [1] :
However, it is not clear whether the hyperbolic function is built in the reward system or if it is an epi-phenomenon, due for example to the growing (with time) uncertainty of the future. Note that this does not satisfy (6), so we will not consider that case in the remainder. In order to ensure convergence, we can generalize to over-harmonic discounting:
Exponential/Geometric Discounting.
The exponential/geometric discounting is often used in reinforcement learning [15] :
In contrast to harmonic discounting, it has the property to be time independent: If one is offered $50 today or $100 tomorrow, then for a = 2 : 2 0 × 50 = 2 −1 × 100, the expected value is the same, and it remains so if the same problem is given in a distant future, e.g. if one is offered $50 in 100 days or $100 in 101 days: 2 −100 × 50 = 2 −101 × 100.
Solomonoff Induction and AIXI
Suppose a predictor is given a sequence of only 0s and 1s. What is the best guess it could do about the next symbol, knowing only that this sequence is generated by some computable but unknown program?
Solomonoff Induction [14] addresses this exact problem. The predictor knows there is an infinity of possible environments that are compatible with the given sequence. Are all these environments equally probable? Or is there an a priori order upon them? Following both Occam's Razor Principle, which roughly states that the best hypothesis is the simplest one, and the Epicurean Principle, which recommends to keep all consistent hypotheses, Solomonoff's answer is to give a higher probability to simpler environments, and that all consistent environments should have a positive probability. He defines the notion of simplicity as the length (q) in bits of a given program q on a prefix universal Turing machine: the shortest programs are the simplest ones. For a sequence x, its simplicity measure is defined by:
where x * is any string that begins with the the string x. M is in fact only a semi-measure and satisfies Kraft's inequality [6] on a prefix universal Turing machine with a binary alphabet:
Solomonoff showed that M converges to the true generator µ (the true environment q 0 gets more and more weight in M ), when the size of the sequence grows [13] .
Based on this work, Hutter extended M to the reinforcement learning framework [2, 5, 4] , where the agent is no longer a passive predictor, but an active agent which outputs actions that the environment may take into account. He also generalized the binary alphabet to a vocabulary of (words of) inputs X and outputs Y . Within this setting, the new semimeasure ξ is essentially equivalent to M . For a program q that is consistent with some history yx <k :
.
Taking ρ = ξ in the previous section gives the definition of the agent AIXI. Since ξ satisfies Kraft's inequality, it is a semi-measure, and since the definition of ξ implies (5) Hutter has proved that AIXI is Pareto optimal [3] , which could make one confident that it always ends up finding the optimal policy for a given history, but we shall see that this is not true.
The good enough and not good enough effects: Theorem 1. For any finite constant reward R allowable by the output alphabet, and for any history yx <k , there exists at least one program p for the environment, consistent with yx <k , so that ∀t ≥ k : r t = R, when r t is output by p; i.e. p will always output R after step k.
Proof. By construction.
This means that even if the most probable environments predict a null reward for all actions, other lower probability programs will predict high rewards. As the agent is optimistic about other possible environments, this pushes it to explore those possibilities. We call this the not good enough effect.
There is an opposite good enough effect that can make the agent lazy when the most probable environments predict a constant high reward for a given action. The other environments will not have a sufficiently high cumulative weight to make the agent try other actions. The latter may then get stuck in some local "good enough" maximum.
We are now going to study the good enough effect in detail.
Asymptotic non-learnability
The framework under consideration for learning agents requires an adequate way to measure the performance of the agents. To see why a particular setting is needed, consider the simple Heaven&Hell environment [5, p.26] . At the first time step, the agent must choose between left and right, one direction leading to Heaven and the other to Hell. Then, for all the following time steps, the agent has no other choice than staying where it is, and receiving a constant reward (+1) in Heaven or a constant punishment (0) in Hell. An uninformed agent cannot know in what direction Heaven is, and in half of the cases, would end up in Hell. AIMU, however, knows the environment, and so always chooses the correct action to go to Heaven. The difference of total rewards gathered by a learning agent and AIMU can then tend to infinity, whereas the agent in fact made only one bad choice. In such a setting, no agent can trivially be optimal in all environments, and it does not seem "fair" to blame the agent for an infinite loss of rewards with only one mistake.
As stated by Hutter, we should then consider other, more plausible criteria: the performance of the agent should then be compared with that of AIMU, but the history of AIMU should be the same as that of the agent, in order to compare the mistakes (suboptimal choices) of the agent, and not their consequences. He refers to this as asymptotic learnability [4, We claim that AIξ (for m k → ∞) can asymptotically learn every problem µ of relevance, i.e. AIξ is asymptotically optimal.
In this paper, we show that, contrary to Hutter's expectations, AIXI cannot asymptotically learn every problem µ of relevance. Intuitively, AIXI, in its current definition, as any other universal agent AIρ choosing its actions with (3), is too greedy, and is in fact optimally greedy: Exploration can sometimes lead to an expected average loss of rewards. It prevents the agent from sufficiently exploring the environment to find better rewards, even in some simple environments. Note that since AIXI is Pareto optimal, this means that improving the convergence to AIMU will not improve the average performance of the agent.
In the remaining of this paper, we discuss the property of generic universal agents AIρ, as a generalization of AIXI.
There exists at least one class of environments where AIρ, and more specifically AIXI, does not explore sufficiently to find the optimal policy: ρ does not always converge toward the true distribution µ, and can get stuck in local maxima.
We use Hutter's asymptotic learnability [4] . Let:
where V µ * t is the expected value using the optimal policy in µ after interaction history yx <k , and V µπ k , with π ≡ p ρ k is the expected value of the policy of AIρ when computed only in the true environment µ. The history yx <k is generated by the interaction between the learning agent and the environment. This simply means that the value of the policy of AIρ converges on average to the value of the policy of AIMU, when AIMU has the same past as AIρ. This definition is weaker than the one used in [9] , because it allows for an infinite number of mistakes 2 . In [9] , the following theorem is proven: Theorem 2. For any universal agent AIρ with a computable horizon function, there exists at least one computable environment µ where AIρ, given some initial history yx <i , does not asymptotically learn µ.
Lattimore points out (personal communication, 2011) that the following theorem can be used to remove the necessity of the initial history, and just let the agent build the sequence yx <i itself, on-policy, in interaction with the environment: Theorem 3 (in [4, p.164]) . If the history yx <k is generated by the policy p and the environment µ, the future universal value V ρp k converges to the true value V µp k , for any summable horizon function:
lim
If µ is a deterministic environment, the expectation can be dropped:
which can be rewritten as:
When p is chosen to be AIρ's policy, it means the value of the policy of the agent converges to the true value of this policy. The true value is the value computed using µ instead of ρ. This does not ensure, however, that there is no other better policy than AIρ's. We can now give the main theorem:
Theorem 4. For any universal agent AIρ with a computable horizon function, there exists at least one computable environment that AIρ does not asymptotically learn.
To prove Theorem 4, we first prove that AIρ stops exploring in some environments (Lemma 1, below). To that end, for a given horizon function γ chosen for the agent, we define a particular (though simple) environment q 1 as follows:
where B k is the set of "blocked" steps, defined inductively by B 0 := ∅ and:
otherwise .
N k depends on the horizon function of the agent AIρ and is defined as follows:
Intuitively, at step k, if the agent chooses action a 1 , it receives a reward unless step k is "blocked". If the agent chooses action a 0 in a non-blocked step, then all the following steps up to N k get blocked, i.e. the agent will not be able to receive a reward in those steps. In the case the agent chooses a 0 in a step k that is already blocked, no new blocked steps are added to the set. This means that if the agent chooses a 0 in a non-blocked step k 1 , then the step N k 1 + 1 is necessarily non-blocked, even if the agent has chosen a 0 at step N k 1 . This ensures that the agent can make rewarding decisions an infinite number of times.
As N k grows at least as fast as the (1 − ) of the total weight), the agent is more and more punished for choosing a 0 in blocked steps, so that the value of doing such a choice should tend to 0. In this environment, the optimal policy exists and consists in always choosing action a 1 .
We can then prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. AIρ eventually stops exploring in environment q 1 , i.e. there exists a step after which AIρ never chooses action a 0 again. Lemma 1. Consider q 1 to be the true environment. Let π ≡ p ρ k be the policy of the agent AIρ. First, note that there is an infinite number of steps where the agent is not blocked, since choosing a 0 in a blocked step is not adding more blocked steps. Let k Let π + be a computable policy that chooses a 1 at all steps. From (1) and (2), we can compute a lower bound on the value of this policy, when computed by AIρ using ρ:
The last inequality is because since q 1 is the true environment, it cannot be discarded, so ρ k (q 1 ) can only increase as other environments get discarded. Then from (12) , there is a time step T after which V ρπ k
, i.e. the agent computes that the policy π + is better than its own best policy π, which contradicts equation (3) (the agent must choose the best expected policy). Thus the agent AIρ cannot continue to choose action a 0 in steps k + i where i > T , and must therefore, after step T , always choose a 1 . Using Lemma 1, we can now prove the main result:
Theorem 4. Given a computable horizon function γ k,t , construct the environment q 1 as above, and define the following environment q 2 :
if y k = a 1 and k ∈ B k 0 if y k = a 1 and k ∈ B k 0 if y k = a 0 and k ≤ T 1 if y k = a 0 and k > T where T is the same as in the proof of Lemma 1, and B k is defined as for q 1 .
When AIρ interacts with q 2 , now taken as the true environment, before step T , q 2 is equivalent to q 1 . After step T , since AIρ never tries action a 0 again, it sees no difference between the two environments, i.e. AIρ will behave in q 2 exactly as in q 1 . Therefore, it will, at each further step, choose the suboptimal action a 1 .
From equations (2) and (3), with π ≡ p ρ k , we then have:
Finally, the result follows from (9):
since whatever happens before step T gets overwhelmed by the infinite number of mistakes after T .
Uncomputable horizon function
The proof of Theorem 2 is only valid for computable horizon functions. Using an uncomputable horizon function may solve the problem and make the agent asymptotically optimal. This function needs to grow faster than any computable function.
We can define such a function as a busy-beaver function [10] :
C(k) is the maximum value that a program p of length at most k can output, when computed on a universal Turing machine U .
Lemma 2.
No computable function grows faster than any other computable function.
Proof. Let f (x) be an hypothetical computable function, monotonically increasing. Suppose f (x) grows faster than any other computable function. Define g(x) = x · f (x) necessarily grows faster than f (x) and is still computable by construction, which contradicts the initial hypothesis.
Theorem 5. C(k) grows faster than any computable function.
Proof. Let f (k) be a computable function. As it is computable, it has a fixed length which minimum is approximately K(f ). K(f, k) grows at most in log(k): K(f, k) < K(f ) + 2 log(k) + c, for a constant c, and thus grows slower than k. Therefore:
where the last inequality holds by definition of C with p = f, k . This means that C(k) grows at least as fast as f (k), whatever the definition of f . From Lemma 2, no computable function grows faster than all other computable functions, therefore C(k) grows faster than any computable function.
We can now simply take a horizon function:
(also compare Hutter's γ k,t = 2 −K(t) [4, p.170] ). Since no computable N k of equation (13) can be at least a constant fraction of C(k), this shows that the proof of Theorem 2 does not carry to an uncomputable horizon function as defined in (14) .
Conclusion and outlook
We have proven that no universal Bayesian agent (like AIXI) can use a computable horizon function to asymptotically learn all computable environments. The main reason is because such agents stop exploring after some time, and therefore may not find certain easy ways to get better rewards. But they are in fact right to do so, since if they continue to explore they might not receive as much reward as they can have with their current behavior. This would then lead to a lower expected reward, and therefore may not be a good option. Henceforth, this result should not be viewed as a defect of AIXI, but rather as a reason why universal reinforcement learning is intrinsically difficult.
To avoid the described problems, one remaining possible solution is to use an incomputable horizon function that grows faster than any computable function. If it happens that this makes AIρ asymptotically optimal, then it would make this model nearly parameter-free, as the horizon function is one of the remaining parameters -another one being the choice of the reference Turing machine, although it does not matter asymptotically, and maybe the choice of the prior, although one may consider ξ to be the best possible choice. Even though there is still a possible choice between different fast horizon functions, it may not really matter, and they might not lead to radically different behaviors. It remains to be shown, however, whether there exists a "natural" -i.e. with a simple definition -uncomputable horizon function that really makes AIρ asymptotically optimal.
